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ABSTRACT. This paper considers why attitudes towards gays and lesbians in 
Latvia appear to be more intolerant than in all other EU member states. The pa-
per argues that while the legacy of communist discourses on homosexuality and 
the impact of post-communist transition have played a role in shaping attitudes 
towards sexuality and sexual minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, these 
factors cannot sufficiently explain the divergence among post-communist states 
and, in particular, do not account for Latvia’s extreme position. While acknowl-
edging that intolerance towards non-heteronormative sexualities cannot be ex-
plained by a single factor, the paper argues that homosexuality has become par-
ticularly reviled in Latvia because it has been widely discursively constructed as 




Following the decades of oppression suffered by Latvian gays and lesbians during the 
period  of  Soviet  occupation,  consenting  sexual  acts  between  adult  men  were  de-
criminalised by the Latvian parliament, the Saeima, in 1992 but on the understanding 
that gays and lesbians in Latvia would remain out of sight.
1 Gays and lesbians were 
indeed largely invisible throughout the nineties but began to move from the private 
into the public sphere as a result of the EU accession process. Emboldened by the 
membership requirement that applicants respect and protect minorities and by civic 
initiatives supported and financed by Brussels, gays and lesbians became increasingly 
visible in the late nineties and in the early years of the new millennium, culminating 
in the first Gay Pride march in Riga in 2005. Gay rights became an explicitly political 
issue when Latvia became a fully fledged member of the European Union in 2004 and 
transposed various directives on human rights and equality, banning discrimination on 
the grounds of sexual orientation.  
 
While these achievements are significant, the general situation for gays and lesbians 
in Latvia remains difficult. Same-sex marriage is explicitly prohibited by Article 35.2 
of the Civil Code and the Latvian Constitution was amended in 2005 to define mar-
riage only as a union of a man and a woman (Article 110).
2 Even amendments to the 
Labour Law came about as the result of pressure from the European Parliament rather 
than the Saeima’s commitment to equal rights for gays and lesbians. Indeed, Latvia 
was the last member state of the EU to transpose the Employment Equality Directive 
banning sexual orientation discrimination in employment. While the first Gay Pride 
march finally went ahead in Riga in 2005, this was only after the District Administra-
                                                 
1  Consenting sexual acts between adult women had never been specifically criminalised. 
2  The Human Rights Office did submit a registered partnership bill in 1999 but it was rejected by the 
parliamentary Human Rights and Public Affairs Commission.   2
tive Court had annulled the City Council’s decision to ban the event, the latter move 
having enjoyed the support of then Prime Minister Aigars Kalvitis. The event went 
ahead but marchers were attacked by religious and far-right demonstrators, as was the 
case in subsequent years. While one might argue that the opinions of a small number 
of protesters at a Gay Pride march are not representative of society at large, the results 
of a broad-based 2006 Eurobarometer poll suggested that Latvians had the highest 
intolerance of gays and lesbians of all member states of the EU at that time, with only 
12% of respondents agreeing that same-sex partnerships should be allowed through-
out Europe.
3 The EU average was 44%. 
 




Source: Eurobarometer 66 (2006: 41) 
 
                                                 
3  The result was slightly lower in Romania but this country was not yet a member of the EU.   3
The aim of this paper is thus to understand why attitudes towards gays and lesbians in 
Latvia are worse than in other EU member states. While acknowledging that intoler-
ance towards non-heteronormative sexualities cannot be explained by a single factor 
but is the cumulative effect of a range of social influences, I argue that homosexuality 
is particularly reviled in Latvia because it is seen as a threat to the continued existence 
of the nation and the core values that seek to define the nation. I begin by analysing 
the influence of religion, the legacy of communist discourse on homosexuality and the 
impact  of  the  transition  from  communism  in  shaping  attitudes  towards  non-
heteronormative sexuality in Central and Eastern Europe to demonstrate that – while 
important – these factors do not sufficiently explain the divergence among the post-
communist states and, in particular, do not account for Latvia’s extreme position. To 
help explain Latvians’ antipathy to equal rights for sexual minorities, I analyse politi-
cal and media discourse to show that homosexuality has been naturalised as the nega-




Perhaps the most commonly cited cause of homophobia throughout the world is relig-
ion. Throughout the centuries the words of St Paul (Romans I: 26-28) and narrative of 
Sodom and Gomorrah (Genesis: 18-19) have been used to condemn same-sex prac-
tices.
4  Indeed,  the  main  branches  of  the  Christian  Church  in  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe  have  certainly  been  highly  vocal  in  their  condemnation  of  non-
heteronormative sexuality. The current position of the Catholic Church to homosexu-
ality is closely tied to its views on procreation. Same-sex acts are considered sinful in 
that sexuality is presented as being ‘naturally ordered to the good of spouses and the 
generation and education of children’ (Catechism of the Catholic Church 2353).
5 Ho-
mosexual acts thus ‘close the sexual act to the gift of life. They do not proceed from a 
genuine affective and sexual complementarity. Under no circumstances can they be 
approved.’ (Catechism of the Catholic Church 2357) The position of the Orthodox 
Church  is  equally  unequivocal.  At  the  August  2000  Sacred  Bishop’s  Council, the 
Russian Orthodox Church adopted ‘The Basis of the Social Concept’, setting out the 
                                                 
4  For an alternative interpretation of the Sodom narrative, see Spong, J.S. (1989) ‘Sodom revisited’, 
New Internationalist, no. 201 
5  As Boswell (1980) demonstrates, however, the Christian Church’s attitude towards homosexuality 
was not always as intolerant.   4
Church’s position on a range of social issues. The chapter entitled ‘Problems of bio-
ethics’ makes it clear that:  
 
The Orthodox Church proceeds from the invariable conviction that the di-
vinely established marital union of man and woman cannot be compared 
to the perverted manifestations of sexuality. She believes homosexuality 
to be a sinful distortion of human nature. … While treating people with 
homosexual inclinations with pastoral responsibility, the Church is reso-
lutely against the attempts to present this sinful tendency as a “norm” and 
even something to be proud of and emulate.
6  
 
While the Lutheran Church is one of the most progressive Christian denominations 
with regard to support for gay rights, with many Scandinavian Lutheran Churches ap-
pointing gay clergy and blessing or performing same-sex marriages, the same is not 
true of the Latvian Lutheran Church. When a bill was drafted by the National Human 
Rights Office that would allow same-sex couples to enjoy the same rights as married 
couples, the head of the Lutheran Church – together with his Catholic and Orthodox 
counterparts – signed an open letter, which read: 
 
We  cannot  have  special  rights  for  homosexual  orientation  as  a  special 
condition. No  one provides  laws  for  kleptomania,  vampires,  alcoholics 
and drug addicts. Regardless of whether these sicknesses are inborn or ob-




Yet how influential is religious teaching on individuals’ attitudes towards homosexu-
ality? Earlier research by Allport and Ross (1967), Kirkpatrick (1949) and Stouffer 
(1955) demonstrated that churchgoers are more authoritarian and less tolerant towards 
sectors of society pursuing alternative lifestyles in general due to pressure to conform 
to the in-group and to their greater likelihood to accept what they are told by authority 
figures.  
                                                 
6  The Basics of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church, chapter XII ‘The problems of 
bioethics’: www.mospat.ru  (official website of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox 
Church; last accessed 15.06.2009) 
7   ‘Human Rights Office backs gay, lesbian rights’, Baltic Times, 07.10.1999
   5
Figure 2: Religious attendance in 10 new EU member states  
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer (2004) 
 
Building  on  this  earlier  work,  more  recent  social  science  research  confirms  that 
strength of religious belief is, in particular, the strongest predictor of negative atti-
tudes to homosexuality. Rowatt et al. (2009) and Whitley (2009) explain the link be-
tween religious belief and intolerance towards gays and lesbians with reference to 
conservatism that is that there are strong correlations between religiosity and conser-
vatism  and  between  conservatism  and  homophobia.  Plugge-Foust  and  Strickland 
(2000) see the relationship between religiosity and homophobia somewhat differently, 
arguing that homophobia is an irrational thought process, with Christians more likely 
to believe that which others would consider irrational. In general, Herek and Glunt 
found that ‘the more often that their subjects went to church, the more hostile those 
subjects were towards homosexuality’ (cited in Plugge-Foust and Strickland (2000: 
241). 
 
However, this does not explain why, according to the Eurobarometer survey cited in 
Figure 1, Poles, 63% of whom attend church regularly, are more supportive of same-
sex marriage than Latvians, only 7% of whom attend church at least once a week (see   6
Fig. 2). While the impact of religion should not be underestimated, attitudes towards 
homosexuality in Latvia are conditioned not by religion per se but rather by the role of 
religion in national identity narratives constructed to legitimise a particular under-
standing of political community. The values espoused by the main churches in Latvia 
are indeed shared by many Latvians. However, this is not because of their religious 
significance but rather because they are presented as national values. 
 
The impact of communism 
As figure 1 shows, all bar one of the former communist member-states of the Euro-
pean Union fall below the EU average with reference to support for gay rights, sug-
gesting that the impact of communist ideology and the communist experience must 
also be taken into account when examining intolerance towards gays in Latvia. In the 
early days of the Soviet Union Bolshevik intellectuals recognised the existence of the 
human sexual drive but insisted on the ‘wholesale subordination of sexuality to the 
proletariat’s class interests … for the sake of the Soviet state and Communist Party’ 
(Kon, 1999: 208). While Karl Marx considered homosexuals to be the deviant prod-
ucts of bourgeois society, there was initially a laissez-faire approach towards homo-
sexuality in the Soviet Union, although attitudes became increasingly intolerant due to 
the changing nature of Party elites, as intellectuals and urban Marxists were replaced 
by officials with peasant backgrounds, resulting in increased anti-intellectualism. As 
all communist citizens were expected to adhere to the ‘psychology of the collective’, 
‘alternative’ sexualities were considered unacceptable, while homosexuality was fur-
ther seen as contrary to the public good in that it could not produce children (Att-
wood, 1996: 102). As men and women in Marxist-Leninist discourse were seen as 
‘two indivisible halves of the same whole’, homosexuality went against the image of 
the communist Man and was thus seen as a ‘dangerous sign of individualism’ and a 
vestige of imperial decadence (ibid.). Nikolai Krylenko, Commissar for Justice, pro-
claimed in 1936 that after two decades of socialism ‘there was no reason for anyone to 
be homosexual’ and individuals continuing to do so must be ‘remnants of the exploit-
ing classes’ (Baird 2007: 71). Lesbianism was considered particularly heinous. While 
men could be excused for not controlling their sexual urges – in whatever direction – 
lesbians it was believe had no excuse, as the existence of female sexuality was all but 
denied. Furthermore, as the identity of women was so closely tied to motherhood, a 
woman putting her sexual interests before the interests of her family was considered   7
to be an outrage. In any case, communist regimes were hostile to sexuality in general 
because they sought ‘to ensure absolute control over the personality’ by attempting ‘to 
deindividualise it, to destroy its independence and emotional world.’ (Kon 1999: 208) 
Therefore,  state-sanctioned  homophobia,  which  was  never  publicly  challenged, 
shaped the opinions of generations of citizens in communist states, who were used to 
being told what to believe by the regime.  
 
While we can assume that the legacy of communism has had an impact on people’s 
attitudes towards homosexuality, this does not explain the variance in the level of 
support for gay rights among post-communist members of the EU. Were the legacy of 
communism to be the key explanatory factor, one would expect to see far greater con-
vergence of opinion. Yet there is a gulf of 40% between Latvia and the Czech Repub-
lic. Even taking account of the different versions of communism in the USSR and the 
Central and East European satellite states, the 9% variance between Latvia and Esto-
nia – which as Soviet republics were both controlled by the same communist regime – 
is not insignificant. While the communist legacy, like religion, does have an important 
impact on attitudes towards homosexuality, it is insufficient to explain the particularly 
negative position in Latvia.  
 
The impact of the post-communist transition 
The final set of factors that can help us understand homophobia in Central and Eastern 
Europe relates to the impact of the collapse of state socialism and subsequent reaction 
against  communism  in  the period  of  transition.  The  collapse  of  state  socialism in 
Eastern Europe triggered massive social, economic and political upheaval and in the 
context of such massive change ‘cultural diversity seems threatening’ (Inglehart and 
Baker 1990: 28). Anything unfamiliar, such as homosexuality, was seen as a threat to 
stability and there was thus a tendency among individuals to ‘cling to traditional gen-
der roles and sexual norms, and emphasize absolute rules and familiar norms in an 
attempt to maximize predictability in an uncertain world.’ (ibid.) The focus on abso-
lute rules and intolerance of difference after the end of the Cold War can itself be seen 
as a part of the legacy of communist political culture, as the Manichean worldview of 
communism and its belief in the perfection of Marxism-Leninism rested on a view of   8
truths as absolute rather than relative: people, states and ideas were either good or bad 
and, if they were not explicitly good, they were implicitly bad.
8 
 
In many former communist states, political elites rejected their communist past and 
harked back to the pre-communist period, to the ‘golden age’ of the 1920s and 1930s 
and its traditional values and norms. As this period was considered the opposite of the 
abnormal  communist  experience,  ‘traditional’  thus  became  equated  with  ‘normal,’ 
with traditional gender and sexual roles seen as ‘an important aspect of the nostalgia 
for ‘normality’’ (Watson 1993: 472-3). What is seen as ‘normal’ has often, however, 
been strictly defined in national, Christian and heterosexual terms and homosexuality 
thus confuses and threatens this traditional order. While ‘abnormal’ behaviour could 
be tolerated in private, the appearance of gays and lesbians in public spaces, particu-
larly those of national or religious significance, was interpreted as a direct attack on 
the ‘norm’ rather than an instance of citizen using their right of free assembly in a 
democratic space. This point was explicitly made by former Latvian Prime Minister 
Aigars Kalvitis: 
 
For me, as the head of government, it is unacceptable that in our capital 
city, in the very heart of Riga, next to the Dome Cathedral, there is a pa-
rade of sexual minorities. This is unacceptable. We are a state based on 




This misrepresentation of what is seen as permissible democratic practice is also re-
flected in politicians’ misunderstanding of concepts such as ‘democracy’ and ‘human 
rights’. Democracy is often used simply to mean ‘rule of the majority’, which frees 
politicians  from  the  need  to  take  account  of  the  rights  of  minority  groups,  while 
claims by certain MPs that human rights are not above the laws of God shows that the 
concept of universal human rights is misunderstood or wilfully distorted. 
 
                                                 
8   This point was made by Zvi Gitelman at the international workshop on ‘Anti-Semitism in an Era of 
Transition’, UCL, 19 June 2009  
9   Aivars Kalvitis, former Prime Minister of Latvia, 20.07.05, Latvian television; Mozaika (2007), p. 
33   9
While the factors we have discussed above could all relate to some to degree to most 
Central and East European states, one political factor is peculiar to Latvia. To under-
stand why an issue of personal morality became such a political issue in Latvia, we 
need to examine the nature of Latvian politics. With the exception of one five-month 
period from February to July 1999 when the Social Democratic Union was invited to 
join the ruling coalition, all Latvian governments since the re-establishment of the in-
dependent Latvian state in 1991 have comprised parties of the right and/or centre-
right. Few democratic states in Europe have been ruled by governments of the same 
ideological complexion for such a long period. To understand why this matters, it is 
helpful to examine Chantal Mouffe’s concept of the ‘democratic paradox’. Mouffe 
(2005: 30) argues that:  
 
A well functioning democracy calls for a clash of democratic political po-
sitions. This is what the confrontation between left and right needs to be 
about. Such a confrontation should provide collective forms of identifica-
tion strong enough to mobilise political passions. … When political fron-
tiers become blurred, disaffection with political parties sets in and one 
witnesses the growth of other types of collective identities, around nation-
alist, religious or ethnic forms of identification.  
 
As there has been no left or centre-left presence in Latvian governments since 1991, 
the adversarial basis of politics is missing. As a result, the confrontation between dif-
ferent political positions is replaced by confrontation between ‘essentialist forms of 
identification or non-negotiable moral values’ (ibid.) In other words, the battle be-
tween  right  and  left  in  Latvia  has  been  replaced  by  the  battle  between  right  and 
wrong. In the Latvian case, the essentialist forms of identification (Latvian-ness) and 
non-negotiable moral values (heterosexism) go hand in hand. However, the nature of 
Latvian politics is a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for the country’s high degree 
of homophobia. While the absence of adversarial confrontation helps us understand 
why issues of morality have become political issues, it does not explain why gay 
rights, in particular, were the focus of political attack rather than, say, the large num-
ber of strip clubs that have opened in Riga since the mid-1990s. To understand this, 
we must, I argue, examine the relationship between (homo)sexuality and nationality. 
   10
Nationality/sexuality 
The nationalist perspective on the relationship between nationality and sexuality fo-
cuses on the biological reproduction of the nation and accordingly presupposes the 
latter to be heterosexual. According to Charles and Hintjens, ‘nationalist ideologies 
which arose in late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Europe were associated 
with attempts on the part of national bourgeoisies to create national collectivities in 
their own image. This image was grounded in a specific gender division of labour, 
sexual orientation and ethnicity’ and also involved ideas of respectability and appro-
priate sexual behaviour (1998: 2). Heterosexuality thus became a taken-for-granted 
attribute of the nation and dominant group norm, against which actions and beliefs 
were judged. In terms of nation-making, the presence of gay men was thought to un-
dermine the ‘male bonding’ required to forge the nation and defend it militarily, while 
homosexuals were also considered not to possess the typically masculine virtues of 
‘willpower, honour, courage’ required to inspire action in the name of the nation (Na-
gel 1998: 245). The perception of gay men as weak and lesbians as strong confuses 
the patriarchal gender order and public and private roles of men and women central to 
most ethno-national discourses. Moreover, the perceived inability of gays and lesbians 
to reproduce is presented as a threat to the continued existence of the nation, a view 
taken to extremes by Poland’s President  Lech  Kaczynski, who  argued that ‘wide-
spread homosexuality would lead to the disappearance of the human race’.
10 Nations 
seeking to define themselves in  ethnic terms, emphasising shared a bloodline and 
common descent, are therefore more likely to have a patriarchal gender order and ab-
solute rules on sexuality, which are enforced even more strictly in contexts of cultural 
pluralism, perceived threats to the continued existence of the nation and in times of 
social and political upheaval. As we shall see in the Latvian context, stressing the het-
erosexuality of the nation allowed nationalists to establish continuity through family 
ties between the pre- and post-communist periods of their history. 
 
The academic perspective on the relationship between nationality and sexuality sees 
both as social constructs. While nationalists themselves and some die-hard primordial-
ist scholars view nations as organic communities united by shared biology, the pre-
vailing view is that they are socially constructed. While sexual desire is biologically 
                                                 
10  ‘Fury at Polish president gay threat warning’, Irish Independent, 21.02.2007 (last accessed: 
25.06.2008)   11
driven, sexual categories and the meanings assigned to them are constructed by insti-
tutions such as the Church and the family as well as by the law and, in particular, by 
medicine.
11  Institutions  such  as  these  ‘produce  and/or  reproduce  ideologies  and 
norms, which define social expectations’ with regard to acceptable mores and behav-
iours (Stuhlhofer and Sandfort 2005: 5). While never fully hegemonic and always 
contested, specific discourses on sexuality are produced to create moral leadership 
and social hierarchy at any given time and to legitimate a particular truth-regime. 
There is, of course, no a priori relationship between nationality and sexuality. The 
relationship between categories and the meanings ascribed to them are culturally and 
historically contingent. As Weeks explains, ‘homosexuality, like all forms of sexual-
ity, has different meanings in different cultures – so much so that it becomes difficult 
to find any common essence which links the different ways it is lived’ (1992, xi). The 
fact that certain societies, such as Scandinavia and the Netherlands, are supportive of 
same-sex partnerships, while others, such as Poland and the Baltic States, are not 
demonstrates that it is impossible to find a meta-level explanation for the meaning as-
cribed to homosexuality that holds across space and time.  
 
Granting  certain  meanings  a  dominant  position  and  excluding  others  is  achieved 
through the establishment of a specific discourse that ‘constitutes and organises social 
relations around a particular structure of meanings’ (Doty 1996:, 239). The unification 
of  the  discursive  field  and  partial  stabilisation  of  its  meanings  and  identities  are 
achieved by constructing its limits through the establishment of a ‘constitutive out-
side,’  also  known  as  othering.  As  Mouffe  explains,  this  difference  ‘is  often  con-
structed on the basis of a hierarchy, for example between form and matter, black and 
white, man and woman, etc.’ (2005:  15). Within a particular discourse, internal unity 
and the constitutive outside are created through the logics of equivalence and differ-
ence.  
 
The logic of equivalence creates chains of equivalence among different discursive 
elements, ‘subverting the differential character  of those terms’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 
2001:128).  In  other  words,  various  unrelated  identities  are  grouped  together  and 
                                                 
11  Indeed, historians of sexuality argue that it was the spread of modern medicine and Freudian psy-
choanalysis that produced the social categories of homosexual and heterosexual (Schluter, 2002, p. 
29). Prior to the late nineteenth century people behaved homosexually or heterosexually - or both - 
but were never classified as such.   12
treated as similar with regard to a common reference point that negates the identity of 
the inside. However, the constitutive outside must be more than just different to the 
various  elements  within  the  discourse;  otherwise,  it  is  simply  another  difference 
within the discourse. The constitutive outside must threaten its existence if it is to 
unify the discursive field and partially stabilise its meanings and identity. In Latvia, I 
argue, the desired conceptualisation of national identity after fifty years of Soviet con-
trol has been partially fixed by constructing homosexuality as the constitutive outside 
of Latvian nationality, that is as the negation of Latvian-ness. To demonstrate this, we 
need to understand how Latvian national identity has been gendered and sexed.  
 
Gender and sexuality in Latvian national identity 
A central narrative in Latvian national discourse has been the spectre of both an inter-
nal and external threat. The Latvian national awakening took place at a time when 
Latvian territory was part of the Russian Empire and controlled at the local level by 
German landowners. Ieva Zake (2008) argues that, rather than seeking independence, 
the main aim of the nationalists at this time was to harden ethnic boundaries to avoid 
cultural assimilation by either Germans (the internal threat) or Russians (the external 
threat). During this period, the key role in challenging the internal threat of cultural 
assimilation was to be played by women, who, as mothers and cultural reproducers, 
were expected to perform traditional gender roles and cultural practices as a means of 
‘establishing markers of difference in the family and for the nation,’ thereby harden-
ing ethnic boundaries (Novikova, 2000: 330). This presupposed a specific gender or-
der based on the patriarchal family, which had been the main unit of - and metaphor 
for - the Latvian nation for centuries. As early as the Middle Ages, the lives of the in-
digenous inhabitants of present-day Latvia began ‘to centre ever more closely around 
the family’ following the loss of political independence as a result of their defeat by 
the Teutonic Knights in the 1200s; the family was the last social unit within which 
they could retain their independence and ‘was the last fortress within which Latvian 
culture and the Latvian language could be kept alive’ (Andrups and Kalve 1954,: 24-
5). The patriarchal structure was clear in that, although the mother ‘was more treas-
ured and revered,’ it was the father who had the final word and, when he died, it was 
the eldest son who became the new head of the family (Rubulis, 1984: 108). 
   13
When Latvia gained independent statehood in 1920, the shift in priorities from the 
cultural to the political promoted ‘a vision of national citizenry that, following the tra-
ditional sex-role distribution in a nation-family, would need  a man at its political 
helm’ (Novikova 2000: 330). While female suffrage was granted in 1920, fewer than 
4% of the members of parliament returned in the elections of that same year were 
women and, consequently, the ‘emerging masculine subject of the new nation con-
tracted women into the realm of the collective symbolic’ (ibid.). Moreover, following 
the  rise  of  authoritarianism  in  the  1930s,  women’s  civil  rights  were  further  con-
strained by the 1935 Civil Law, which gave husbands the legal right to make deci-
sions within the family (Eglitis, 2002, p. 190).  
 
Following the annexation of Latvia by the USSR in 1940, Latvians were then subject 
to a specific gender order institutionalised by the communist regime in which the roles 
of men and women were defined according to the perceived needs of the Soviet state. 
According to Latvian nationalists, the traditional nation-family was distorted by this 
regime in that it sought to ‘liberate’ women from their domestic roles by transferring 
childcare from the private to the public sphere, while at the same time undermining 
the traditional masculine roles of father and breadwinner by assuming responsibility 
for safeguarding women’s role as mothers and ensuring them access to paid work 
(Ashwin, 2000). The communist experience therefore resulted in what Latvians saw 
as ‘the distortion of social relations between men and women’ in that it confused the 
public and private gender roles central to the nation-family (Latvia Human Develop-
ment Report 1995, p. 37). As in medieval Latvia, however, the family remained a site 
of resistance to foreign rule, a sphere where national traditions and culture could be 
transmitted in the face of the Soviet regime’s denationalising project. As Einhorn con-
firms, ‘[u]nder state socialism, many people invested the family with meaning as the 
source of dignity and creativity’ and ‘as fostering solidarity in an atomized society’ to 
the extent that there was ‘a tendency to idealize it’ (2002, p. 59-60).  
 
As this brief historical digression shows, Latvian national discourse has emphasised 
the idea of the nation-as-family, clear public and private roles for men and women as 
well as ethno-cultural reproduction through women, with the heterosexuality of the 
nation taken for granted. By the end of the period of Soviet rule, however, this con-
ceptualisation of Latvian-ness was under threat. The nation-as-family and its tradi-  14
tional gender roles were distorted, while the centrality of ethnic culture had been un-
dermined by decades of mass migration by Russian-speakers, which resulted in the 
proportion of ethnic Latvians in Latvia dropping to 52% by 1991 and in ethnic Latvi-
ans constituting a minority in all major cities. To counter the perceived threat to the 
continued existence of the Latvian nation and to deal with the legacy of the Soviet 
past, social and political actors after 1991 sought discursively to exclude phenomena 
which undermined the desired conceptualisation of Latvian national identity, while at 
the same time emphasising the role of the family and tradition as a means of creating 
stability and continuity in times of uncertainty and social and political change.  
 
Contemporary discourses of nationality and sexuality 
In the cultural and historical context of post-communist Latvia, anything seen as ‘non-
traditional’ and thereby ‘abnormal’ was considered to be not just alien but a threat to 
the continued existence of the Latvian nation in its desired ethnic form. As a result, 
political parties in Latvia sought to ‘heterosex’ the nation and present homosexuality 
as un-Latvian (Waitt 2005, 177). One can thus discern twin discourses of ‘Latvian 
ethno-nationality’ and ‘homosexuality’, whereby the latter is presented as a threat to 
the existence of the former, unifying its discursive field and thereby partially stabilis-
ing its identity and the meanings ascribed to it. This is not to suggest that homosexual-
ity is presented as the only threat to the Latvian nation. As we shall see below, it is 
placed in a chain of equivalence with other elements to construct the constitutive out-
side of the ethno-national discourse. For the purpose of this paper, however, I seek to 
show that attempts to naturalise an antagonistic relationship between Latvian national-
ity and homosexuality help us understand why support for gay rights in Latvia is so 
low. Drawing on Latvian and UK media sources and on the ‘Database of Quotes on 
Homophobic Speech in Latvia’, the following section sets out the key tropes of the 
‘ethno-nationality’ and ‘homosexuality’ discourses in Latvia to show how they are 






                                                 
12   Created by Mozaīka, the Latvian alliance of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered Persons and 
their Friends in Latvia.   15
Fig. 3: Main tropes in ‘Latvian ethno-nationality’ and ‘Homosexuality’ discourses 
 
           Latvian ethno-nationality  Homosexuality 
  Under threat  Threat 
    - Internal      - Internal 
    - External      - External 
  Normal/traditional  Abnormal 
  Natural  Unnatural 
  Family-centred  Anti-family 
              Religious  Irreligious 
 
The first trope is the idea of a ‘national threat’. As discussed above, the spectre of in-
ternal and external threats to the Latvian nation has historically been a central narra-
tive in Latvian national discourse and is still a frequent theme today, with the Russian-
speaking community seen as the internal threat, due to their dominant demographic 
position in the main cities and their perceived unwillingness to learn the Latvian lan-
guage, and the European Union often presented as an external threat to Latvia for re-
quiring the state to liberalise its citizenship laws and adopt legislation aimed at pro-
viding equal rights for sexual minorities. Latvian politicians have played on this his-
toric fear of twin internal and external threats when attacking gay rights. For instance, 
following the debate in parliament on anti-discrimination legalisation, Janis Smits, the 
Chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Commission, recommended that any 
deputy who voted in favour ‘should no longer go and place flowers by the Monument 
to Freedom, because with his vote he will be the same as those people who once tried 
to annihilate our people’.
13 Echoing the views of Polish President Kaczynski, Latvian 
nationalists blamed homosexuality for the potential end of the nation. According to a 
joint statement issued by nine family organisations and political parties, the estab-
lishment of gay and lesbian organisations was ‘nothing less than planned genocide 
against the Latvian nation’.
14 As Ainars Slesers, a deputy for the Latvia’s First Party 
explained: ‘You must understand that we don’t want to repress anyone. But we also 
                                                 
13   Parliament plenary session, 31.05.06; Official Record of Parliament; Mozaika (2007), p. 30. 
14   ILGA-Europe 2001, 40   16
cannot silently look at what is happening today. We already have a demographic crisis 
but now we also have homosexual propaganda!’
15  
 
The internal threat was also linked to the external threat from the EU, perceived as 
forcing its liberal, secular and supra-national agenda on new member-states. Janis 
Smits, insisted that Latvians ‘say a clear “no” to all those wise men from the West, 
who want to suggest that our people undertake voluntary suicide because, as  you 
know, children do not come from homosexualists [sic]’.
16 The requirement that the 
Latvian parliament transpose the Employment Equality Directive banning sexual ori-
entation discrimination in employment prompted six Latvian MPs to write to Stras-
bourg,  denouncing  ‘the  attacks  by  the  homosexual  group  of  European  Parliament 
members who are trying to limit our freedom of speech and our religious convic-
tions.’
17 The campaign was supported by religious leaders, criticising this ‘foreign-
inspired action, in which a handful of people with questionable morals try to force the 
institutions of government to accept their perverse views’.
18 It was even claimed that 
homosexuality did not exist in Latvia until the country joined the EU.
19  
 
As discussed above, the Soviet experience was seen as abnormal by Latvians and the 
desire to be normal was thus a ‘unifying notion in the period of opposition to Soviet 
communism,’ with normality ‘a site of political contestation after the restoration of 
Latvian independence’ (Stukuls 1999: 537). In rejecting the Soviet past, Latvian na-
tionalists sought to return to the pre-annexation period, harking back to the Golden 
Age of the 1920s and 1930s and the traditional values and norms of the era. As this 
era was considered the opposite of the abnormal Soviet experience, ‘traditional’ thus 
became equated with ‘normal’ (Watson, 1993: 472-3). Gays and lesbians thus threat-
ened tradition and the normality which Latvian nationalists sought to achieve, with the 
abnormality  of  homosexuality  frequently  referenced  in  anti-gay discourses.  Peteris 
Tabuns,  a  deputy  for  the  conservative-nationalist  For  Fatherland  and  Freedom 
(LNNK) party repeatedly emphasised Latvians’ ‘normal principles of morality’ which 
                                                 
15   Homepage of the Latvian People’s Party website; Mozaika (2007), p. 30 
16   Parliament plenary session, 31.05.06; Official Record of Parliament; Mozaika (2007), p. 31 
17   ‘Latvian MPs attack gays for immoral and hooligan behaviour’, Pink News, 03.06.08 
18   ‘Catholic Cardinal Calls Gays ‘Prostitutes’ in Latvian Outburst’, UK Gay News, 10.05.2007: 
www.ukgaynews.org.uk (last accessed 01.03.2010) 
19   Crucible of hate’, The Guardian, 1 June 2007: 
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jun/01/gayrights.poland (last accessed: 03.03.2010)   17
he contrasted with the behavioural norms of gays and lesbians, who are ‘abnormally 
oriented’.
20 Former government minister Ainars Bastiks deemed Riga Pride to be of-
fensive because ‘an abnormality’ was ‘proclaimed as a normal occurrence’.
21 Linking 
sexuality to citizenship, former Prime Minister Andris Skele stated that only ‘correct-
ly oriented’ people could ‘create a nation’ and that ‘differently oriented people should 
not be allowed to occupy responsible State positions’.
22 The attempt by sexual minori-
ties ‘to convince all of society that sexual relationships between members of the same 
sex is a totally normal occurrence’ was even presented as ‘dangerous,’ the threat of 
such action lying in the fact that it blurs the clearly defined and stoutly maintained 
‘distinction  between  normality  and  abnormality,’  which,  according  to  George  L. 




The normality of heterosexuality is tied to and reinforced by the fact that it is pre-
sented as ‘natural’. The idea of ‘nature’ is often invoked when attempts are made to 
legitimise discrimination against gay men and women in that ‘homosexuality … pre-
sents a threat to the family and a threat to the natural order’ (Landes 2008). The as-
sumed naturality of the return to the traditional Latvian family after fifty years of So-
viet rule was clear in the 1995 Latvia Human Development Report, for example. Pre-
pared jointly with the United Nations Development Programme but written by local 
academics and politicians, the chapter on ‘Women in Transition’ reported that ‘a good 
portion of a woman’s life is occupied by bearing and raising children, caring for the 
home and family. For men, raising children and caring for children do not require 
leaving work. This division of labour is natural and acceptable to all.’ (Latvia Human 







                                                 
20   Parliament plenary session, 31.05.06; Official Record of Parliament; Mozaika (2007), 37 
21   Rīgas Balss, 20.07.05; Mozaika (2007), 25 
22   Rigas Laiks, no. 3, 1996; ILGA-Europe, 2001, 40 
23   Homepage of the Latvian People’s Party website; Mozaika (2007), 30   18
Fig. 4: Selected statements about the family by Latvian politicians 
 
 
‘The popularisation of homosexual relations and the demands to accept it 
as a norm will lead us to the degradation of our basic values: an under-





‘A strong, traditional family is the greatest value for the country. And only 
by strengthening and defending it, we can overcome the demographic crisis 




‘Family rights are threatened [by Gay Pride] – only within marriage be-
tween   a man and a woman can children be created. Latvia, which is dying 






Furthermore, as Almers Ludvigs, Inese Šlesere and Ainārs Baštiks make clear above 
(see Fig. 4), it is the ‘natural’ or ‘traditional’ family that is seen as the key to the fu-
ture of the ethnic nation. Combining the key tropes of ‘natural/traditional’ and ‘fam-
ily’ thus enables them to legitimise their opposition to equal rights for gays and lesbi-
ans by presenting the latter as a threat to the desired future. Furthermore, the tradi-
tional  family  allows  ‘the  ruptures  between  pre-  and  post-communist  Latvia  to  be 
masked’ in that continuity can be established through kinship ties between Latvians of 
the First Republic and Latvians of the post-Soviet state (Waitt 2005: 167). The per-
ception  of  the  ‘national  threat’  thus  emphasised  ‘the  centrality of procreation  and 
motherhood as public rather than private issues and has given traditionalist claims le-
                                                 
24   Almers Ludvigs, Riga City Council deputy, Chas, 09.07.2006; Mozaika (2007),  31-2 
25   Inese Slesere MP, Parliament plenary session, 15.09.05; Official Record of Parliament; Mozaika 
(2007),. 21 
26   Ainars Bastiks, Rīgas Balss, 20.07.05; Mozaika (2007), 25   19
gitimacy among broad sectors of the populations’ (Stukuls 1999: 541). Presenting 
homosexuality as unnatural thus allows discrimination against gays and lesbians to be 
legitimated in the name of the future of the Latvian ethnic nation. 
 
As noted above, homosexuality is not the only element of the constitutive outside of 
the Latvian nationality discourse; it is one – albeit a very effective one – of many 
elements that are grouped together in a chain of equivalence to mark the boundary 
between the desired conceptualisation of the Self and Other. The use of a chain of 
equivalence can be clearly seen in the claim by Inara Ostrovska, a deputy from the 
New Era party,  that ‘anyone can go along with the socialists, communists, Brussels, 
the Kremlin, the UN, homosexualists, Soros
27, foreigners and support their values. I 
choose Latvia, Latgale [a region in Eastern Latvia] the Christian faith, our traditions 
and morality.’
28 There is obviously nothing that socialism, the UN and homosexuals 
share other than their being defined as threats to Latvian national identity, itself con-
structed on the basis of a chain of equivalence of Christianity, Latvian traditions and 
(undefined)  Latvian  morality.  Similarly,  Peteris  Tabuns’s  objection  to  the  ‘unre-
stricted spread of pederasty [homosexuality], pornography, drug addiction and alco-
holism being interpreted as human rights achievements’ seeks to establish an equiva-
lence between unrelated elements, which are united solely by the threat they are per-
ceived to pose to the desired conceptualization of Latvian morality (Waitt 2005:  170). 
 
Conclusion: ‘More gays, less Latvians!’
29 
To deal with the legacy of the Soviet past, ensure the continued existence of the Lat-
vian nation in its desired ethnic form and to create stability and continuity in times of 
uncertainty and socio-political change, politicians in post-Soviet Latvia have sought to 
construct a conceptualisation of Latvian ethno-national identity based on the family 
and on traditional gender roles and sexual norms, which are presented as ‘normal’ in 
opposition to the ‘abnormal’ Soviet experience. To establish this hegemonic ethno-
national discourse, phenomena which undermine the desired conceptualisation of Lat-
vian national identity have had to be discursively excluded. In the cultural and histori-
                                                 
27   References to George Soros, the entrepreneur and currency trader, are often shorthand for ‘Jew’. I 
would like to thank to Zvi Gitelman for making me aware of this. 
28   Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze, 20.07.06; Mozaika (2007), 22 
29   Banner held by a protester at Riga Gay Pride, Summer 2009; ‘Flying the flag: why Pride is still 
relevant’, The Independent, 18 June 2009: www.independent.co.uk/life-style/love-sex/flying-the-
flag-why-pride-is-still-relevant-1707556.html (last accessed: 20.06.2009)   20
cal  context  of  post-communist  Latvia,  anything  perceived  as  ‘non-traditional’  and 
‘abnormal’ was thus considered not just alien but as a threat to the very existence of 
the Latvian nation. Tapping into established historical fears of internal and external 
threats and the idealisation of the nation-family, a broad range of politicians – MPs, 
government ministers and the Prime Minister – have presented homosexuality as the 
negation of Latvian-ness. While this alone cannot explain the low level of support for 
equal rights for gays and lesbians in the country, the discursive practice of othering 
homosexuality to counter the perceived ‘national threat’ – in conjunction with the in-
fluence of religion, the communist legacy, the impact of the political transition and the 
peculiar nature of Latvian party politics – helps us gain a more nuanced understanding 
of the problem of homophobia in Latvia.   21
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